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Abstract 
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permanent shocks can yield quite different inter-country comparisons of unemployment 
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inter-country comparisons. 
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1 Introduction
Much of the existing unemployment literature draws on two alternative, ex-
treme views of how unemployment moves through time: the natural rate and
hysteresis theories. The natural rate theory, in its simplest form, represents
unemployment movements as random variations around a reasonably sta-
ble natural rate of unemployment; and in more sophisticated developments,1
the natural rate is portrayed as moving in response to permanent shocks
in the stationary, long-run equilibrium unemployment rate (e.g. changes in
unemployment benefits, taxes, social security contributions, interest rates,
and union density). The hysteresis theory, by contrast, asserts that unem-
ployment tends to get stuck at wherever the previous labour market shocks
have placed it. In the former view temporary labour market shocks have
temporary unemployment effects; whereas in the latter view these shocks
lead to permanent changes in unemployment.2 Numerous studies attempt
to bridge the gap between these extreme positions; they do so by suppos-
ing that unemployment depends on its lagged values but tends towards a
stable natural rate, as in the dynamically stable variants of the equation3
ut =
∑p
i=1 αiut−i + βxt + εt, εt ∼ i.i.d (0, σ2). Then the natural rate is
unt =
βxt
1−Ppi=1 αi . In such hybrid models, temporary labour market shocks (εt)
have persistent, but not permanent, effects on unemployment.
All the above approaches, however, tend ignore two interesting and po-
tentially important dimensions of the unemployment problem:
1. Not only are current labour market decisions - such as employment,
wage setting, and labour force participation decisions - characterised
by lagged responses to past labour market activities,4 but these lagged
responses interact with one another in affecting unemployment. If the
lagged responses are complementary to one another, it will take unem-
ployment much longer to recover in the aftermath of a recession than
the period spanned by any particular lag. For example, a current drop
in labour demand can depress employment in the following period on
1See, for example, Phelps (1994).
2The simplest representation of the natural rate theory is ut = un + εt, where ut is
the unemployment rate at time t, un is the natural rate, and εt is a strict white noise
stochastic process. An analogous representation of the hysteresis theory is ut = ut−1+ εt.
3The coefficients αi are constants, βxt is a linear combination of exogenous variables,
and the roots of the characteristic equation λp − α1λp−1 − ...− αp = 0 lie inside the unit
circle, so that the equation is dynamically stable.
4For instance, firms’ current employment decisions commonly may depend on their past
employment on account of labour turnover costs, and current wage decisions depend on
past unemployment when search effort declines with people’s duration of unemployment.
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account of labour turnover costs; this raises the duration of people’s
unemployment spells, thereby reducing search intensity and depress-
ing employment in the next period; and so on. Thus, unemployment
movements that are commonly attributed to changes in the NAIRU or
to hysteretic responses to temporary shocks may arise from a lengthy
interaction among various lagged adjustment processes. This point is
obvious, but the interaction of lagged adjustment processes has received
little explicit attention in the unemployment literature thus far.
2. Furthermore the resulting network of lagged labour market adjustment
processes interacts with the dynamic structure of the labour market
shocks. Naturally, unemployment responds differently through time
to a temporary shock than to a permanent one. In the context of a
first-order unemployment autoregression it is well-known, for example,
that the more long-lasting are the unemployment effects of a temporary
shock, the longer it takes for unemployment to approach its long-run
equilibrium in response to a permanent shock; in short, the degree
of unemployment persistence in response to temporary shocks is posi-
tively related to the degree of inertia in response to permanent shocks.
But for higher-order unemployment autoregressions, this correspon-
dence breaks down: unemployment persistence may be positively or
negatively related to unemployment inertia. Thus far little has been
done to provide theoretical and empirical analyses of how lags in labour
demand, wage setting, and labour force participation schedules influ-
ence the relation between the unemployment effects of temporary and
permanent shocks.
The natural rate theory underplays the first dimension - the interactions
among lagged labour market adjustment processes - by focusing attention on
the long-run equilibrium unemployment rate that is reached once the adjust-
ment processes have worked themselves out. The hysteresis theory avoids ex-
amining the lagged interactions by focusing on the unit root of the time-series
unemployment process.5 The hybrid models above, based on single-equation
models of unemployment, do not do justice to the lagged interactions either.
The empirical single-equation models are meant to be summaries of empir-
ical multi-equation labour market systems,6 but the lagged interactions in
5In general, there is of course no reason why the lagged interactions should imply a
unit root; this could happen only by accident.
6In the systems approach unemployment is typically portrayed as the difference between
labour supply and labour demand in a system containing employment, wage setting, and
labour force participation equations.
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the empirical systems do not aggregate to produce equivalent unemployment
dynamics in the empirical single-equation models.7 In particular, the statis-
tically significant lags in the single-equation models characteristically imply
far less unemployment persistence (in response to temporary shocks) than is
implied by the statistically significant lags of estimated multi-equation labour
market systems.
Many of the conventional unemployment models overlook the second
dimension above, since they focus primarily on temporary labour market
shocks. The random variations around the natural rate are temporary; so are
the shocks that lead to the permanent unemployment effects in the hysteresis
models and to the long-lasting unemployment effects in the hybrid models
above. But in practice labour market shocks have both temporary and per-
manent components. Whereas some aggregate business cycle fluctuations
are temporary, changes in productivity, exchange rates, raw material prices,
taxes, and real interest rates are often permanent. The interplay between
shock dynamics and labour market dynamics requires explicit attention.
The aim of this paper is to focus on the neglected dimensions above.
We will consider labour market models where current decisions - regarding
employment, wage setting, and labour force participation - depend on past
decisions, and where these lagged adjustments interact. These interactions
are the centerpiece of the chain reaction theory of unemployment, in which
each labour market shock has a “chain reaction” of unemployment effects.
The network of lagged adjustment processes is the propagation mechanism
for this chain reaction.
In this context, we will construct aggregative summary measures of the
dynamic unemployment responses to temporary and permanent shocks. We
will be concerned with two important dynamic influences: (i) the persistent
unemployment effects of temporary shocks, called unemployment persistence,
and (ii) the delayed unemployment effects of permanent shocks, which we
will call imperfect unemployment responsiveness. Our aggregative measures
of unemployment persistence and imperfect unemployment responsiveness
can perform a useful role in characterising the movement of unemployment
through time, analogous to the way in which macroeconomic indices (such
as GNP or inflation) are useful in characterising macroeconomic activity at
each point in time.
Focusing on three countries - Germany, the United Kingdom, and the
United States - we will identify significant lags in labour demand, wage set-
ting, and labour force participation behaviour, and measure the degree to
7The econometric reasons for this failure are well-known, e.g. nonlinearities in t-
statistics.
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which these lags are responsible for unemployment persistence and imperfect
responsiveness. Elsewhere it has been shown that lagged unemployment re-
sponses to temporary and persistent shocks - as captured through unemploy-
ment persistence and imperfect responsiveness - play an important role deter-
mining the evolution of unemployment in various industrialised economies.8
Our analysis of the sources underlying persistence and responsiveness con-
stitutes a first step toward providing an understanding the medium- and
longer-term movements of unemployment.
The policy implications of our approach are striking. First, since differ-
ent employment policies affect different lagged adjustments, examining the
role of each lag within its network of lagged adjustments is important for
policy formulation. Second, labour market shocks of different durations may
require different policy responses. And finally, since lagged labour market ad-
justment processes tend to differ markedly from country to country, different
countries may require different policies to deal with what looks superficially
as a similar unemployment problem.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a theo-
retical model of unemployment persistence and responsiveness and analyzes
how the lagged adjustment processes contribute to these phenomena. Section
3 contains our empirical analysis, in which we examine how the movement of
unemployment in Germany, the UK, and the US over the past four decades
can be clarified through the concepts above. Finally Section 4 concludes.
2 AModel of Unemployment Persistence and
Responsiveness
The theoretical model in this section provides a background for the empir-
ical model of Section 3. In particular, the theoretical model illustrates how
the interaction among lagged labour market adjustment processes generates
persistence and imperfect responsiveness of unemployment. It indicates how
these two phenomena are distinct from one another, describing different dy-
namic features of unemployment. These features, together, will provide in-
sights into the way unemployment moves through time.
2.1 The Underlying Model
Our theoretical framework provides simple examples of lagged adjustment
processes occurring in labour demand, wage setting, and labour force partic-
8See, for example, Karanassou and Snower (1998, 2000).
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ipation decisions.9 We consider a labour market containing a fixed number
of identical firms with monopoly power in the product market. The i’th firm
has a production function of the form
qSi,t = Ae
α
i,tk
β
i,t, (1a)
where qSi,t is output supplied, ei,t is employment, ki,t is capital stock, A, α, β
are positive constants, and 0 < α < 1. Each firm faces a product demand
function of the form
qDi,t =
(
pi,t
pt
)−η
yt
f
, (1b)
where yt stands for aggregate product demand, f is the number of firms, pi,t
is the price charged by firm i, pt is the aggregate price level, and η is the
price elasticity of product demand (a positive constant). Note that the firms
are assumed to face symmetric production and cost conditions.
To derive the firm’s labour demand function, we observe that the firm
sets its employment at the profit maximizing level, at which the marginal
revenue from producing an extra unit of output is equal to the corresponding
marginal cost (for a given capital stock). The marginal revenue is MRi,t =
pi,t
(
1− 1
η
)
. Let the marginal cost be MCi,t = ωi,t
(
∂ei,t
∂qi,t
)
ξi,t, where ωi,t
is the wage paid by the firm,
∂ei,t
∂qi,t
is the marginal labour requirement, and
ξi,t is an employment adjustment parameter. The employment adjustment
parameter is ξi,t = (ei,t/σei,t−1)
δ, where δ is a positive constant and σ is the
“survival rate,” i.e. one minus the separation rate. For simplicity, we assume
that the separation rate is sufficiently high (the survival rate is sufficiently
low), so that ei,t > σei,t−1. The employment adjustment parameter may be
interpreted in terms of training costs: ei,t/σei,t−1 = 1 + (hi,t/σei,t−1), where
hi,t is new hires. The training of new hires (hi,t) in period t is done by
the incumbent employees (σei,t−1) in that period. The greater the ratio of
new hires to incumbent employees, the greater the average training cost per
employee (ξi,t). When δ = 0 (so that ξi,t = 1), the employment adjustment
cost is zero; and when δ > 0 (so that ξi,t > 1), the adjustment cost is positive.
For the production function above, the marginal product of labour (the
inverse of the marginal labour requirement) is
∂qi,t
∂ei,t
= αAe
−(1−α)
i,t k
β
i,t. Thus the
marginal cost is MCi,t =
ωi,t
αA
e1−αi,t k
−β
i,t ξi,t. Setting the marginal revenue equal
9Our analysis is in the spirit of recent theoretical models of aggregate labour market
activity (e.g. Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), Lindbeck and Snower (1989), Nickell
(1995)).
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to the marginal cost, we obtain the firm’s (implicit) labour demand function:
ωi,t
αA
e1−αi,t k
−β
i,t
(
ei,t
σei,t−1
)δ
= pi,t
(
1− 1
η
)
. (2)
In the labour market equilibrium, pi,t = pt and ωi,t = ωt, due to sym-
metry. Aggregating the individual firms’ labour demand functions, taking
logarithms, so that Et = log (fei,t) Kt = log (fki,t), and introducing an error
term (εt) to capture technological shocks, we obtain the following aggregate
employment equation:10
Et = a
∗ + a∗EEt−1 − awwt + a∗KKt + εt, (3)
where wt = log (ωt/pt) and εt ∼ i.i.d (0, σ2ε). The parameter a∗E will be called
the “employment inertia coefficient.” When the employment adjustment
cost is zero (δ = 0), the employment inertia coefficient is zero; when the
adjustment cost is positive (δ > 0), the employment inertia coefficient is
positive as well.
For simplicity, let the wage be equal to the reservation wage of the
marginal employee. Suppose that the population of workers is heteroge-
neous in terms of the disutility of work and thus also in terms of the reser-
vation wage. Moreover, suppose that this population can be ordered along
a reservation wage continuum, from lowest to highest, so that when aggre-
gate employment rises, the reservation of the marginal worker rises as well.
Assuming this relation to be linear, our wage setting equation becomes
wt = b+ bEEt. (4)
The labour force participation decision equates the marginal return from
being in the labour force with the associated marginal cost being in the
labour force. For simplicity, let the per capita return (in logs) from being in
the labour force be positively related to the employment probability (Et−Lt,
where Lt is the size of the labour force, in logs) and to the wage (wt), and
negatively related to the inactivity rate (Lt−Zt, where Zt is the log of working
age population). Specifically, let the return from being in the labour force
be given by d1 + d2 (Et − Lt) + d3wt − d4 (Lt − Zt), where d1, d2, d3 and d4
are positive constants.
Regarding the cost per capita of being in the labour force, suppose that
there are costs of entry into the labour force and that these costs depend
10a∗ =
log(1− 1η )+log(αA)+δ log σ+(1−α−β) log f
1+δ−α , and a
∗
E =
δ
1+δ−α , and aw =
1
1+δ−α , a
∗
K =
β
1+δ−α .
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positively on the ratio of new labour force entrants to incumbent members
of the labour force. Accordingly, let the cost per capita (in logs) be given by
c1+ c2Lt− c3Lt−1 (where the new labour force entrants are positively related
to Lt − Lt−1, the number of incumbents are positively related to Lt−1, and
c2 > c3). Setting the per capita return equal to the per capita marginal cost,
we obtain the following labour force participation equation:11
Lt = c
∗ + cLLt−1 + cwwt + c∗EEt + cZZt, (5)
The coefficient cL may be called the “labour force inertia coefficient.”
Substitution of equation (4) into (3) and (5) yields:
Et = a+ aEEt−1 + aKKt +
(
1
1 + awbE
)
εt, (6)
Lt = c+ cLLt−1 + cEEt + cZZt, (7)
where a = a
∗−awb
1+awbE
, aE =
aE∗
1+awbE
, aK =
a∗K
1+awbE
, c = c∗ + cwb, cE = c∗E + cwbE.
(Note that 0 < aE < 1, and 0 < cL < 1.)
Finally, the unemployment rate ut may be approximated as the difference
between the log of the labour force Lt and the log of employment Et:
ut = Lt − Et. (8)
The model contains two lagged adjustment effects: (i) current employ-
ment depends on past employment, (ii) the current labour force depends on
the past labour force. For ease of exposition, we will call these two effects
the employment adjustment effect,12 and the labour force adjustment effect,
respectively. It is important to emphasize that these names are merely heuris-
tic devices that help us refer the individual lagged effect.13 The employment
adjustment, and labour force adjustment effects are usually taken to be pos-
itive: aE, cL > 0 and we will maintain this assumption here.
11c∗ = −c1+d1c2+d2+d4 , cw =
d3
c2+d2+d4
, c∗E =
d2
c2+d2+d4
, cL = c3c2+d2+d4 , and cZ =
d4
c2+d2+d4
.
12For instance, firms’ current employment decisions commonly may depend on their
past employment on account of costs of labour turnover costs (e.g. Lindbeck and Snower
(1988) and Nickell (1978)).
13We naturally do not wish to imply that the employment adjustment effect arises only
account of employment adjustment costs, and that the labour force adjustment effect
arises only account of labour force adjustment costs . Clearly, when agents optimise their
objectives intertemporally, each of the individual lagged effects will, in general, arise from
a variety of sources.
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Equations (6)-(8) yield the following reduced form unemployment rate
equation:14
ut = (aE + cL)ut−1 − aEcLut−2
−
(
1− cE
1 + awbE
)
εt +
(
cL
1 + awbE
)
εt−1 − aK (1− cE)Kt + aKcLKt−1
+acE + (1− aE) c− (1− cL) a+ cZZt − cZaEZt−1. (9)
As noted, the labour market system (6)-(8) is merely illustrative of in-
teracting lagged adjustment processes in the labour market. The micro-
foundations of these and other lagged adjustments have been explored ex-
tensively in the theoretical literature.15 Whereas the equations above have
been derived in particularly simple ways, in general these equations are the
outcomes of complex intertemporal optimisation problems. For instance, a
labour demand equation is usually derived from the maximisation of the
firms’ present value of profits (under perfect or imperfect competition) sub-
ject to sequences of production function constraints; a wage setting equation
is generally be derived on the basis of bargaining between firms and their
employees, efficiency wage setting by firms, or labour union wage setting;
and a labour force participation equation is often derived from workers’ in-
tertemporal utility maximisation subject to sequences of budget constraints.
In these intertemporal contexts, employment, wage, and labour supply de-
cisions depend on the agents’ rational expectations of future economic vari-
ables. These expectations may be expressed in terms of the present and past
values of these economic variables, which are then substituted into the rel-
evant first-order conditions of agents’ optimisation problems. Consequently,
the labour demand, wage setting, and labour force participation equations
may be expressed in terms of present and past variables, as illustrate in the
model above.
The focus of attention in this paper is not, however, the microeconomic
sources of the lagged labour market adjustments; rather, we are interested
in how these lagged adjustments (whatever their sources) interact with one
another and with labour market shocks to generate an unemployment tra-
jectory. For this purpose, we suppose that the participants in the labour
market face known distributions of labour market shocks. These shocks may
take the form of white noise variations in the labour demand, wage setting,
14See Appendix 1, eq.(A1.4) and (A1.4’).
15For example, Taylor (1979) rationalise the dependence of current wages on past wages,
Lindbeck and Snower (1987) rationalise the relation between current wages and past em-
ployment, and so on.
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and labour supply equations (that are temporary shocks) and variations in
the future realizations of the exogenous variables (that could be permanent
shocks).16 On this basis, they make their labour market decisions, yielding
an equation system with lagged adjustments (such as the illustrative one
above), which we take as the starting point of our analysis. We then con-
sider how realizations of the temporary and permanent shocks interact with
the system’s network of lagged adjustments to generate unemployment per-
sistence and imperfect unemployment responsiveness. It is this interaction
that occupies centre-stage in our analysis.17
With this in mind, we now examine how temporary and permanent shocks
give rise to chain reactions of unemployment effects.
2.2 Unemployment Persistence
Suppose that in period t there is a temporary (one-period) unit fall in labour
demand: dεt = −1. The immediate impact is of course to reduce employment
and thereby raise unemployment by a unit. Thereafter (in periods t+i, i > 0)
the labour demand shock dεt has the following two effects.
• (i) Via the employment adjustment effect (whose magnitude is given by
the coefficient aE), the shock dεt reduces employment Et+i (by aEdεt)
below what it would have been in the absence of the shock (and thus
raises unemployment ut+i).
• (ii) Via the labour force adjustment effect (whose magnitude is given by
the coefficient cL), the shock reduces the labour force Lt+i (by cEdεt)
below what it would otherwise have been (and thereby reducing unem-
ployment ut+i).
The movement of unemployment in response to the temporary shock may
be explained wholly through the interactions of these three effects.
It can be shown that the unemployment response j periods after the shock
is18
dut+j =
ajE [(1− cE) aE − cL] + cEcj+1L
(1 + awbE) (aE − cL) , (10)
16An example is capital stock in the model above.
17It is important that the shocks be realizations from the known distributions generating
the error terms and exogenous variables, for otherwise the occurrence of a new shock may
be expected to affect the agents’ decision making, leading to revised employment, wage
setting, and labour supply equations (with revised lag structures).
18The chain reaction of unemployment movements, period by period, is described in
Appendix 1.
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where dut+j is the difference between unemployment in the presence and
absence of the shock.19 This indicates how the unemployment effects of the
temporary shock persist through time.
2.2.1 Quantitative and Temporal Persistence
The phenomenon of “unemployment persistence” has two interesting fea-
tures, which may be measured by two separate statistics:
(1) Quantitative unemployment persistence measures the degree to which
unemployment is affected by the temporary shock after that shock has dis-
appeared. Specifically, for a unit shock occurring in period t, it is the sum
of the unemployment effects for all periods t+ j, j ≥ 1:
piQ =
∞∑
j=1
dut+j. (11a)
In the absence of lagged labour market adjustment processes, unemployment
would not be affected after the temporary shock has disappeared and thus
quantitative unemployment persistence piQ would be zero. At the opposite
extreme of hysteresis, the temporary shock would have a permanent effect
on unemployment and thus piQ would be infinite.
(2) Temporal unemployment persistence measures how long it takes for
the unemployment effect of the shock to shrink to a fraction κ of its initial
value. Specifically, it measures the maximum number of periods, after the
occurrence of the unit shock, over which the unemployment effect exceeds
the fraction κ of the initial effect:
piT = argmax
j>0
(|dut+j| > κ |dut|) . (11b)
Once again, in the absence of lagged adjustment processes, piT would be zero;
whereas in the presence of hysteresis, piT would be infinite.
The two statistics are concerned with different economic phenomena.
Whereas quantitative persistence is concerned with the cumulative amount of
unused labour resources over time generated in the aftermath of the tempo-
rary shock, temporal persistence deals with the time required for the influence
of the shock to disappear.20
19Thus the operator d describes a comparative static difference (rather than a change
through time).
20In other words, temporal persistence measures how long it takes for unemployment to
return to a specified neighbourhood of the time path it would have followed in the absence
of the shock.
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For the unemployment equation (9), the degree of quantitative unemploy-
ment persistence is 21:
piQ =
aE (1− cL) (1− cE)− cEcL
(1 + awbE) (1− aE) (1− cL) , (12)
whereas the degree of temporal unemployment persistence cannot be derived
explicitly in general terms.
2.2.2 Sources of Unemployment Persistence
With a view to the empirical analysis later, we examine the sources of un-
employment persistence by showing how each of the lagged adjustment pro-
cesses contributes to unemployment persistence. For brevity, we focus on
quantitative persistence piQ.
To measure the influence of the employment adjustment effect (EA) on
quantitative persistence, we compute the difference between piQ in the pres-
ence and absence of the EA effect, given that the labour force adjustment
effect is in operation. In the absence of the employment adjustment effect,
the employment equation (3) becomes Et = a
∗ + a∗EEt − awwt + a∗KKt + εt.
It can be shown22 that the associated degree of persistence is
piQ∼EA =
−cEcL
(1 + awbE) (1− aE) (1− cL) < 0,
where “∼ EA” stands for the “absence of the employment adjustment effect.”
Thus our measure of the degree of quantitative unemployment persistence
attributable to the employment adjustment effect is total persistence minus
persistence in the absence of the EA effect:23
piQEA = pi
Q − piQ∼EA =
aE (1− cE)
(1 + awbE) (1− aE) . (13a)
21See Appendix 1.
22The derivation of this and other sources of persistence is given in Appendix 1.
23Note that the influence of the employment adjustment effect on quantitative persis-
tence cannot be measured by taking the derivative of piQ with respect to aE , since a change
in aE alters not only the magnitude of the employment adjustment process towards a given
labour market equilibrium, but also alters the equilibrium itself. After all, unemployment
persistence is about protracted adjustment to equilibrium rather than a shift of the equi-
librium. To measure the contribution of a small change in the adjustment process on
persistence, it would be necessary to specify the coefficients of the lagged variables in our
labour market system in such a way that coefficient changes would leave the labour market
equilibrium unchanged.
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Similarly, the influence of the labour force adjustment effect on quantita-
tive persistence may be evaluated by computing the difference between persis-
tence in the presence and absence of this effect, in the presence of the employ-
ment adjustment process. In the absence of the labour force adjustment ef-
fect, the labour force equation (5) becomes Lt = c
∗+cLLt+cwwt+c∗EEt+cZZt
and the associated degree of persistence is
piQ∼LF =
aE (1− cE − cL)
(1 + awbE) (1− aE) (1− cL) .
Hence the degree of quantitative unemployment persistence attributable to
the labour force adjustment effect is
piQLF = pi
Q − piQ∼LF =
−cEcL
(1 + awbE) (1− cL) < 0. (13b)
It is interesting to observe that the role of the adjustment processes is
to determine how the unemployment effects of a temporary shock are split
between the present and the future. To see this, let m (the “multiplier”)
stand for the current effect of the shock on unemployment; f stand for the
sum of the future effects; and τ = m+ f stand for the total effect (over the
present and future). For the labour market system (6)-(8),
m ≡ dut = 1− cE
1 + awbE
; f ≡ piQ; τ = (1− cL − cE)
(1 + awbE) (1− aE) (1− cL) . (14a)
However, in the absence of the employment adjustment effect:
m∼EA =
1− cE
(1 + awbE) (1− aE) ; f∼EA = pi
Q
∼EA; m∼EA + f∼EA = τ ; (14b)
and in the absence of the labour force adjustment effect:
m∼LF =
1− cE − cL
(1 + awbE) (1− cL) ; f∼LF = pi
Q
∼LF ; m∼LF + f∼LF = τ . (14c)
Equations (14a-c) show that the presence of the lagged adjustment processes
influences the distribution of unemployment effects through time (the relative
magnitude ofm and τ , the current and future effects), but not the total effect
τ .
Finally, observe that adding the sources of persistence (piQEA + pi
Q
LF ) does
not yield the aggregate measure of persistence (piQ). The reason of course
is that each source of persistence is measured by taking the difference be-
tween persistence in the presence and absence of that sources, assuming that
the other source is operative. Since the different sources interact with one
another, the various sources cannot be added to yield aggregate persistence.24
24In fact, it can be shown that piQEA + pi
Q
LF > pi
Q, i.e. the employment and labour force
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2.3 Imperfect Unemployment Responsiveness
Next consider the chain reaction of unemployment changes in response to a
permanent labour demand shock. Assuming that the capital stock follows a
random walk, Kt = Kt−1 + vt, we let the permanent shock be represented
by a realization of the white noise error term vt in this stochastic process.
25
Specifically, suppose that in period t there is a temporary (one-period) unit
fall in vt, which has a permanent negative influence on the capital stock Kt.
In the initial period t, the employment effect of this fall in the capital stock
is dEt = −aK . In subsequent periods the shock has the following effects:
(i) it continues to have a direct effect on employment by dEt+j = −aK in
each period j > 0 (since the influence on the capital stock is permanent);
(ii) due to the employment adjustment effect, the fall in employment Et+j
reduces employment Et+j+1 below what it would have been in the absence
of the shock; and (iii) due to the labour force adjustment effect, the fall
in employment Et+j reduces the labour force Lt+j+1 below what it would
otherwise have been.
These three effects all interact with one another, producing a chain re-
action of unemployment movements, so that the unemployment response j
periods after the period-t shock is
dut+j =
(
aK
aE − cL
)[
(1− cE)
j∑
i=0
(
ai+1E − ci+1L
)− cL j∑
i=0
(
aiE − ciL
)]
, (15)
where dut+j is now defined as the difference between unemployment in the
presence and absence of the permanent labour demand shock.26
2.3.1 Quantitative and Temporal Responsiveness
Analogously to our analysis of unemployment persistence, we assess imperfect
unemployment responsiveness from two vantage points:
(1) Quantitative imperfect responsiveness measures the cumulative unem-
ployment effect of the permanent shock that arises because unemployment
does not adjust immediately to the new long-run equilibrium. In particular,
for a unit shock beginning in period t, quantitative imperfect responsiveness
is the sum of the differences through time between (a) the disparity between
adjustment effects are substitutes in this model (i.e. the joint effects are less than the sum
of the individual effects).
25For simplicity, we also assume that the error terms εt and vt are independent of one
another.
26The theoretical results on imperfect responsiveness are derived in Appendix 2.
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actual and long-run unemployment in the presence of the shock and (b) this
disparity in the absence of the shock:27
ρQ =
∞∑
j=0
(dut+j − du∗) . (16a)
By equation (15), the effect of the permanent shock on long-run employment
is
du∗ ≡ lim
j→∞
dut+j =
aK (1− cE − cL)
(1− aE) (1− cL) .
In the absence of lagged labour market adjustment processes, unemploy-
ment would be “perfectly responsive,” i.e. it would adjust immediately to its
new long-run expected rate, and thus ρQ would be zero. If however the full
effects of the permanent labour demand shock emerge only gradually, so that
the short-run unemployment effects of the shock are less than the long-run
effect, then unemployment is “under-responsive”: ρQ < 0, i.e. unemploy-
ment displays inertia. On the other hand, if unemployment overshoots its
long-run equilibrium, then our measure may be positive, making unemploy-
ment “over-responsive”: ρQ > 0. As we approach hysteresis, ρQ approaches
infinity.
For the unemployment rate equation (9), the degree of quantitative im-
perfect unemployment responsiveness may be derived explicitly:28
ρQ =
aK [−aE (1− cE − cL) (1− cL) + cLcE (1− aE)]
[(1− aE) (1− cL)]2
. (17)
(2) Temporal imperfect responsiveness measures how long its takes for
unemployment to reach a particular neighbourhood of its new long-run equi-
librium. Specifically, it measures the maximum number of periods j over
which the difference dut+j − du∗ (i.e. the difference between the actual and
long-run expected unemployment rates in the presence and absence of the
shock in any period t + j) exceeds the fraction κ of the initial difference
dut − du∗:
ρT = argmax
j>0
(|dut+j − du∗| > κ |dut − du∗|) . (16b)
As above, ρT would be zero in the absence of labour market lags, and it
approaches infinity as we approach hysteresis.
27This is equivalent to the differences through time between (a) the disparity between
the actual unemployment rate in the presence and absence of the shock (dut+j), and (b)
the disparity between the long-run unemployment rate in the presence and absence of the
shock (du∗).
28See Appendix 2.
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2.3.2 Sources of Imperfect Responsiveness
We now turn to the sources of imperfect responsiveness. In the absence of the
employment adjustment effect, it can be shown that the degree of imperfect
responsiveness is29
ρQ∼EA =
aKcLcE
(1− aE) (1− cL)2
> 0.
If cE + cL < 1 then ρ
Q
∼EA > ρ
Q, i.e. the employment adjustment effect
magnifies the inertia of unemployment, making unemployment to respond
more slowly to a permanent labour demand shock than it would otherwise
have done.30 Thus the degree of quantitative responsiveness attributable to
the employment adjustment effect is
ρQEA = ρ
Q − ρQ∼EA = −
aKaE (1− cE − cL)
(1− aE)2 (1− cL)
, (18a)
which is negative if cE + cL < 1, i.e. the employment adjustment effect
makes unemployment more under-responsive than it would otherwise have
been (ρQEA < 0).
Along the same lines, the degree of quantitative responsiveness attributable
to the labour force adjustment effect is
ρQLF =
aKcLcE
(1− aE) (1− cL)2
> 0. (18b)
Since the labour force adjustment effect causes the labour force to fall
in the future (when cL > 0), in tandem with the fall in employment, this
effect thereby reduces the inertia of unemployment, making unemployment
less under-responsive that it would otherwise have been (ρQLF > 0).
Observe that in this model there are no complementarities or substi-
tutabilities between the two adjustment effects since ρQEA + ρ
Q
LF = ρ
Q.31
2.4 The Relation between Persistence and Imperfect
Responsiveness
Persistence and imperfect responsiveness are the outcome of the same con-
stellation of lagged labour market adjustment processes; the only difference
29See Appendix 2.
30In other words, unemployment is more over-responsive in the absence of the employ-
ment adjustment effect than in its presence.
31This result is specific to our model. In other models, of course, sources of imperfect
responsiveness may be complements or substitutes, in the sense that the joint effects may
be greater or less than the sum of the individual effects, respectively.
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between these phenomena lies in the nature of the labour market shock ini-
tiating these processes. By exploring the relation between persistence and
imperfect responsiveness, we can gain insight into how the interaction be-
tween the shocks and the adjustment processes depends on the durability of
the shocks.
The simplest - and, unfortunately, the most misleading - way of thinking
about the relation between persistence and imperfect responsiveness is in the
context of a first-order difference equation in unemployment. For instance, in
our model above, suppose that there were no labour force adjustment effect
(cL = 0). Thus the only remaining adjustment process is the employment
adjustment effect (aE > 0). The unemployment equation (9’) then reduces
to
ut = aEut−1 −
(
1− cE
1 + awbE
)
εt +−aK (1− cE)Kt
+acE + (1− aE) c+ cZZt − cZaEZt−1,
In this simple context, it is easy to see that quantitative persistence and quan-
titative imperfect responsiveness are inversely related to one another. Both
depend on the magnitude of the autoregressive coefficient (aE). The greater is
this coefficient, the greater is quantitative persistence
(
piQ = aE(1−cE)
(1−aE)(1+awbE)
)
and the smaller is quantitative imperfect responsiveness
(
ρQ = − aEaK
(1−aE)2
)
.
In other words, the greater is the autoregressive coefficient, the greater is
the sum of the unemployment after-effects from a temporary shock and the
smaller the sum of the unemployment responses to a permanent shock. Since
persistence and imperfect responsiveness are tied to one another in this way,
it is clearly unnecessary to view them as separate phenomena.
However, as noted, this account of the relation between persistence and
imperfect responsiveness is misleading, since it invariably occurs only in first-
order unemployment equations. For higher-order equations - the sort we are
overwhelmingly likely to encounter in empirical labour market systems, where
a variety of lagged adjustment processes are operative - the above relation is
only one of various possibilities. Then, of course, persistence and imperfect
responsiveness are indeed separate phenomena. Reintroducing the labour
force adjustment effect into our model indicates why this is so.
In this expanded model (containing an employment adjustment effect
(aE > 0) and a labour force adjustment effect (cL > 0)), it turns out that,
when cE+cL < 1, the relation between persistence and imperfect responsive-
ness depends critically on the autoregressive coefficient aE, measuring the
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employment adjustment effect. There are three scenarios:32
1. When the employment adjustment effect is “high,” aE >
cEcL
(1−cL)(1−cE−cL)+cEcL ,
then quantitative persistence is positive
(
piQ > 0
)
and quantitative im-
perfect responsiveness is negative ρQ < 0 (viz., “under-responsiveness”
to permanent shocks). This scenario exhibits inertia in response to both
temporary and permanent shocks: (a) an unemployment-increasing
temporary shock leads cumulatively to more unemployment after the
shock has disappeared; whereas (b) an unemployment-increasing per-
manent shock leads cumulatively to less unemployment than would
have occurred under instantaneous adjustment. Furthermore, at the
lower bound of this scenario, when aE =
cEcL
(1−cL)(1−cE−cL)+cEcL , unem-
ployment becomes perfectly responsive (ρQ = 0).
2. When the employment adjustment effect falls within an “intermedi-
ate” range, cEcL
(1−cL)(1−cE) < aE <
cEcL
(1−cL)(1−cE−cL)+cEcL , both persistence
and imperfect responsiveness are positive (piQ > 0 and ρQ > 0). Here
we find inertia with respect to temporary shocks, but overshooting with
respect to permanent shocks. The unemployment-increasing temporary
shock still generates more unemployment, cumulatively, after the shock
has disappeared. But the unemployment-increasing permanent shock
leads the unemployment rate to overshoot its long-run equilibrium by
such a large amount that, cumulatively, there is more unemployment
than would have occurred under instantaneous adjustment. Moreover,
at the lower bound of this scenario, when aE =
cEcL
(1−cL)(1−cE) , unemploy-
ment persistence falls to zero (piQ = 0).
3. Finally, when the employment adjustment effect is “low,” aE <
cEcL
(1−cL)(1−cE) ,
persistence is negative and imperfect responsiveness is positive (piQ < 0
and ρQ > 0). In this scenario there is overshooting in response to both
temporary and permanent shocks. The unemployment-increasing per-
manent shock leads to overshooting along the same lines as in the
“intermediate” scenario. But now the unemployment-increasing tem-
porary shock also leads to overshooting and, as result, it leads to cu-
mulatively less unemployment after the shock has disappeared.
In short, as the employment adjustment effect gradually rises, the degree
of persistence rises (progressively larger quantitative after-effects of a tem-
porary shock on unemployment) and the degree of imperfect responsiveness
32For details see equations (A1.9’) and (A2.6’) in Appendices 1 and 2, respectively.
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falls (progressively smaller quantitative after-effects of a permanent shock on
unemployment).
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Estimating a Labour Market Model
We now explore how the movement of unemployment in three countries -
Germany, the UK, and the US - may be explained through the phenomena
above. For this purpose we estimate a labour market model for the UK
and US using annual data over the period 1964-1992, and for Germany over
the period 1964-1990 . The model is a straightforward extension of the
illustrative theoretical model in Section 2; it has the following general form:
a0 (B)Et = a1 (B)wt + a2 (L)Kt + a3 (L)X1t + ε1t, (14a)
b0 (B)wt = b1 (B)Et + b2 (B)Kt + b3 (B)X2t + ε2t, (14b)
c0 (B)Lt = c1 (B)wt + c2 (B)ut + c3 (B)Zt + c4 (B)X3t + ε3t, (14c)
ut = Lt − Et, (14d)
where ai (B), bi (B), and ci (B) are polynomials in the backshift operator
and Xit are vectors of exogenous variables. The three equations stand for a
labour demand function (representing the aggregate employment level, for a
given real wage, capital stock, and other exogenous variables), a wage set-
ting function (representing the equilibrium real wage, for a given employment
level, capital stock, and other exogenous variables), a labour supply function
(representing the equilibrium labour force, for a given real wage, unemploy-
ment rate, population, and other exogenous variables), and a definition of the
unemployment rate. The underlying definitions and sources of our variables
are given in Table 1.
Our estimation is based on the “autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL)
modelling approach to cointegration analysis” proposed by Pesaran and Shin
(1995)33. The reason for adopting the ARDL modelling approach, instead of
the popular “cointegration/error-correction” one, is twofold: first, since the
ARDL approach is applicable irrespective of whether the regressors are I (0)
33According to Pesaran and Shin (1995) “...the traditional ARDL approach justified in
the case of trend-stationary regressors, is in fact equally valid even if the regressors are
first-difference stationary”.
See also Pesaran (1997), and Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1996).
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or I (1) , the pre-testing problems that surround the cointegration analysis do
not arise, and second, the estimated coefficients can be given a straightfor-
ward economic interpretations, e.g. the coefficients of the lagged employment
terms in the labour demand equation may be interpreted in terms of the costs
of employment adjustment.34
The equations for our labour market model were selected on the basis of
either the Akaike Information Criterion or the Schwartz Bayesian Criterion
(equations [T1]-[T9], in Tables 2-4, for the UK, US, and German labour mar-
kets), and they all pass the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests for structural sta-
bility. For the UK and US equations neither endogeneity nor cross-equation
correlation were detected. However, since this was not the case for Germany,
we estimated the German labour market equations as a system using 3SLS
(equations [T10]-[T12] in Table 5). Table 7 presents a full range of misspec-
ification tests for equations [T1]-[T12] and Table 6 reports Sargan’s test for
overidentifying restrictions. Observe that our selected equations consist of
stationary, well-specified linear combinations of the variables involved.
Two features of our equations deserve special mention. First, whereas
employment depends inversely on the real wage in the German employment
equation, it depends positively on the real wage in the UK and US em-
ployment equations. These results are readily interpreted in terms of the
recent theoretical literature showing that whereas the labour demand curve
is generally downward-sloping under full capacity and diminishing returns
to labour, it may be flat or upward-sloping under excess capital capacity.35
The reason is that, in the presence of unused capital, a rise in employment is
generally accompanied by a rise in the amount of capital used, and thereby
returns to scale - rather than returns to labour - come to play a dominant
role in determining the slope of the labour demand curve. Second, the in-
sider membership effect is negative in the US wage equation, but positive
in the German wage equation. These results are interpretable through the
insider-outsider literature (see footnote 6).
34See Karanassou and Snower (1997) for further details on the choice of the empirical
model and estimation methodology.
35See, for example, Lindbeck and Snower (1994).
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3.2 Estimating Persistence and Imperfect Responsive-
ness
3.2.1 Deriving the Measures of Persistence and Imperfect Re-
sponsiveness
To derive our measures of unemployment persistence, we conduct the follow-
ing post-sample simulation exercises on each country’s labour market system.
We generate the time series for unemployment in the absence of the shock
(ut) by solving each system forwards until the unemployment rate attains its
long-run equilibrium level (u∗), holding the exogenous variables constant.36
We create the time series for unemployment in the presence of the temporary
shock (u
′
t) by reducing the constant term in the labour demand equation by
1.0 in the first year only of the simulation period and solving the resulting
system forwards.37 The sum of the differences, dut = u
′
t − ut, from year 2
onwards, yields our measure of quantitative unemployment persistence (piQ),
of eq. (7a).38 The measure of temporal unemployment persistence (piT ), of
eq. (7b), is given by the maximum number of years it takes for the unem-
ployment effect of the temporary shock to remain above 10% of the initial
impact.
To derive our measures of imperfect unemployment responsiveness, we
assume that the log of the capital stock (Kt) follows a random walk pro-
cess, and we impose a permanent shock whereby the constant term in the
capital stock equation is reduced by 1.0 in the first year only of the simula-
tion period.39 The resulting system is solved forwards until unemployment
36Since each labour market system consists of equations which satisfy the stability con-
ditions, ut will converge to its long-run value, regardless of the initial conditions, once the
exogenous variables are held constant. In addition, for the purposes of computing unem-
ployment persistence and imperfect responsiveness, it does not matter at what levels the
exogenous variables are held constant for the following reason. Since each system is linear,
the values of the exogenous variables do not affect the difference between unemployment
in the presence and absence of the shock or the difference between long-run unemployment
in the presence and absence of a permanent shock.
37Since the German labour market system exhibits cross-equation correlation, a shock
to the employment equation will be accompanied by a shock to both the wage-setting and
labour force equations. To incorporate the latter in our simulation exercises, we assume
that ε̂2t = b1ε̂1t + v2t, ε̂3t = b2ε̂1t + b3ε̂2t + v3t, where ε̂1t, ε̂2t, ε̂3t are the residuals from
the labour demand, wage-setting and labour supply equations. So we estimate the above
equations by OLS and we then reduce the constants in the German wage setting and
labour supply equations by b1 and (b2 + b3b1), respectively.
38In Appendix 3 we present an analytical method for the computation of our measures
of quantitative unemployment persistence.
39Since Kt is assumed to follow a random walk, a one-period unit shock to the capital
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attains its new long-run equilibrium û∗, holding the other exogenous vari-
ables constant. Letting ût and ut be the predicted unemployment rates in
the presence and absence of the permanent shock (respectively) and letting
û∗and u∗ be the long-run unemployment rates in the presence and absence
of the shock (respectively), we obtain our measure of quantitative imperfect
responsiveness (ρQ) through equation (12a). We measure temporal imperfect
responsiveness (ρT ), of equation (12b), as the maximum number of years it
takes for (dut − du∗), where dut = (ût − ut) and du∗ = (û∗ − u∗), to remain
above 10% of the initial difference between these disparities.
Our measures of persistence and responsiveness are reported in Table 8.
The standard errors and 95% confidence intervals for these measures were
obtained from Monte Carlo simulations. Each Monte Carlo experiment con-
sists of R = 400 replications. In each replication (i), a vector of error terms
ε
(i)
t =
(
ε
(i)
1t , ε
(i)
2t , ε
(i)
3t
)′
(of the labour demand, wage setting, and labour supply
equations, respectively) was drawn from the normal distribution,40 N(0,
∑
).
The vector ε
(i)
t was then added to the labour market system to generate a
new vector of endogenous variables y
(i)
t =
(
E
(i)
t , w
(i)
t , L
(i)
t , u
(i)
t = L
(i)
t − E(i)t
)
.
Next, the labour market system was estimated using the new vector endoge-
nous variables y
(i)
t , and the set of exogenous variables. Finally, the above
simulation exercises were conducted on the newly estimated labour mar-
ket system. In this way, each replication (i) yielded a set of persistence
and responsiveness measures: xi =
{
piQi , pi
T
i , ρ
Q
i , ρ
T
i
}
. The standard errors,
reported in Table 8, were computed as
(∑R
i=1 x
2
i −Rx2
)
/ (R− 1), where
x =
(∑R
i=1 xi
)
/R . Furthermore, since each generated series xi, i = 1, ...R,
does not necessarily follow the normal distribution, we also computed the cor-
responding 95% confidence intervals by ranking the values of each element of
xi in ascending order and cutting off the bottom 10 and top 10 observations.
3.2.2 Empirical Results on Aggregate Persistence
Our empirical results concerning these aggregate measures of quantitative
persistence, summarised in the piQ and piT rows of Table 8, are striking. Ob-
stock equation will have a permanent impact on Kt. Consequently, employment and the
unemployment rate are permanently affected.
40We used the normal distribution because the assumption of normality is valid in all
three estimated labour market systems. Thus εt ∼ N (0,
∑
), where
∑
is the variance-
covariance matrix of the estimated labour market model. For the UK and US, the off-
diagonal elements of
∑
were set to zero, since for these countries the cross-equation
correlations were found to be statistically insignificant.
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serve that our quantitative and temporal persistence measures yield quite
different inter-country comparisons. Although this contrast is not surprising
- since quantitative and temporal persistence are quite different phenomena41
- it has not received attention in the literature thus far. Quantitative persis-
tence (piQ in Table 8) is both positive and significant (in terms of standard
errors) in both the UK and German labour market systems, but insignifi-
cant in the US system. By contrast, all three countries feature significant
temporal persistence (piT in Table 8).
Quantitative persistence of UK is about three times as large as that of
Germany. In particular, a temporary unit fall in labour demand leads to
a cumulative future rise in unemployment by 2.17 in the UK and 0.72 in
Germany.
On the other hand, temporal persistence in the UK is about double that
in Germany; and whereas the US system displays no positive persistence, its
temporal persistence is roughly of the same magnitude as that of Germany.
As shown in Table 8, it takes about 6 years for 90% of the unemployment
effect of a temporary shock to work itself out in the UK, but only about 3
years to do so in Germany and the US.
Our estimates of the German, UK, and US systems suggest that the
labour market lag structures of these countries are quite different and that
these differences have important consequences for the temporal distribution
of unemployment effects. As Table 8 shows, the total quantitative unem-
ployment effect (τ) of a labour demand shock differs markedly among the
three countries, viz., it is larger in the UK than in Germany and larger in
Germany than in the US. Interestingly, these differences are not significantly
due to disparities in the current unemployment effect of a temporary shock,
since all three countries have roughly comparable unemployment multipliers
(m). Rather, these differences arise primarily from disparities in the future
unemployment effect of such a shock (since the countries differ sharply in
terms of quantitative persistence (piQ). For example, in the UK the future
unemployment effect (piQ) of a temporary shock is nearly three times as
large as the current effect (m); whereas in Germany the current and future
unemployment effects are about equal.
3.2.3 Empirical Results on Imperfect Responsiveness
Now turn to our empirical results concerning aggregate measures of quanti-
tative imperfect responsiveness, summarised in the ρQ and ρT rows of Table
41Recall that quantitative persistence captures the magnitude of the future unemploy-
ment effects of a current shock, whereas and temporal persistence measures the time it
takes to return to equilibrium.
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8. It is interesting to compare these results with those on persistence. As
with persistence, both the UK and German systems are characterised by sig-
nificant, positive quantitative imperfect responsiveness, whereas imperfect
responsiveness in the US system is insignificant.
Both the UK and Germany are over-responsive: A permanent unit shock
leads to overshooting, so that unemployment is cumulatively higher than
it would have been under instantaneous adjustment. Over-responsiveness
is about three times as large as that of Germany. (In the UK cumulative
unemployment is 4.88 times higher than under instantaneous adjustment,
whereas in Germany it is 1.65 times higher.)
By contrast, all the countries exhibit roughly comparable degrees of tem-
poral imperfect responsiveness. Specifically, it takes about 3 years for 90% of
the unemployment effect of a permanent shock to work itself out in all three
countries.
The overall picture that emerges from these results is that (i) lagged
labour market adjustment processes play an important role in explaining how
temporary and permanent shocks affect unemployment, (ii) the inter-country
comparisons of unemployment effects due to temporary shocks (as measured
by persistence) differ markedly from those due to permanent shocks (as mea-
sured by imperfect responsiveness), and (iii) the inter-country comparisons of
quantitative measures of dynamic processes (regarding both persistence and
imperfect responsiveness) are quite distinct from those of temporal measures.
3.3 Estimating the Sources of Persistence and Imper-
fect Responsiveness
We now examine the contributions of individual labour market lags to un-
employment persistence and imperfect responsiveness. We focus attention
on the following lagged effects:42
• the lagged employment terms in the employment equation: the em-
ployment adjustment effect (EA);
• the lagged employment terms in the wage setting equation: the insider
membership effect (IM);
• the lagged real wage terms in the wage setting equation: the wage
staggering effect (WS);
42As above, the names assigned to these effects are merely a heuristic device; they do
not imply, of course, that the lagged terms could not arise for reasons other than the
named ones.
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• the lagged unemployment terms in the wage setting equation are the
long-term unemployment effect (LU);43
• The lagged labour force terms in the labour force equation are the
labour force adjustment effect (LF ).44
(It is important to recall that these names are just heuristic devices; they
are not meant to identify unique sources of the lagged effects.)
To derive our measures of persistence45 and imperfect responsiveness in
the absence of each of these lagged effects, we repeated the post-sample
simulation exercises above, with the following amendments:
• to derive unemployment in the absence of the employment adjustment
effect, we set Et−2 = Et−1 = Et in the employment equation;
• to examine unemployment in the absence of the wage staggering effect,
we set wt−2 = wt−1 = wt in the wage equation;
• to find unemployment in the absence of the long-term unemployment
effect, we set ut−1 = ut in the wage equation;
• to examine unemployment in the absence of the insider membership
effect, we set Et−1 = Et in the wage equation; and
• to derive unemployment in the absence of the labour force adjustment
effect, we set Lt−2 = Lt−1 = Lt in the labour force equation.
Tables 9a and 9b give the measures of quantitative unemployment per-
sistence and imperfect responsiveness in the absence of the individual lagged
effects, while Tables 10a and 10b report the corresponding measures of the
contributions of the individual effects (EA,WS,LU, IM, and LF ) to persis-
tence and imperfect responsiveness.
Observe that the employment adjustment effect (piQEA) augments quan-
titative persistence by approximately the same amount in all three coun-
tries. This effect, however, diminishes quantitative imperfect responsiveness
in these countries, with the negative contribution in the UK exceeding that
of the US which in turn exceeds that of Germany.
43This name is appropriate since the long-term unemployed tend to search less inten-
sively for jobs and thus have less influence on the wage setting process than the short-term
unemployed (e.g. Layard and Bean (1989).
44This name is appropriate since costs of entry to and exit from the labour force make
the current labour force depend on its past magnitudes.
45The measures of quantitative persistence in the absence of the above adjustment effects
are derived analytically in Appendix 3.
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The labour force adjustment effect (piQLF ), by contrast, reduces quanti-
tative persistence in all three countries, whereas it augments quantitative
imperfect responsiveness in the US and Germany. The insider membership
effect (piQIM) reduces quantitative persistence and augments imperfect respon-
siveness in the US and Germany. In addition, the wage staggering effect and
the long-term unemployment effect contribute positively to quantitative per-
sistence and negatively to quantitative imperfect responsiveness in Germany.
4 Concluding Thoughts
Although the analytical building blocks of our analysis are quite standard -
there is nothing surprising in the recognition that labour market behaviour
is characterised by significant lags, or that these lags interact with one an-
other - the thrust of our analysis is quite distinct from the natural rate and
hysteresis literatures. Rather than concentrating primarily on the determi-
nants of the long-run equilibrium unemployment rate (as the natural theory
commonly does) or on the history of labour market shocks (as the hysteresis
theory does), our analysis focuses on the interplay among lagged adjustment
processes and the interplay between a network of lagged adjustments (on the
one hand) and temporary versus permanent shocks (on the other). Instead
of seeing labour market behaviour in essentially static terms, the chain re-
action theory views unemployment as the dynamic response to an unending
sequence of labour market shocks with various dynamic characteristics. Since
the shocks never stop, the adjustment processes never have the opportunity
to work themselves out fully, and consequently the adjustment dynamics play
a central role determining the movement of unemployment.
This paper has sought to capture some salient features of unemployment
adjustment dynamics: persistence and imperfect responsiveness. We have
constructed two aggregate measures of these features: quantitative and tem-
poral measures. And finally, we have estimated the contributions of individ-
ual lagged effects to these aggregate measures.
In the context of estimated systems describing the German, UK, and US
labour markets, we have shown that lagged adjustment processes play an
important part in explaining how temporary and permanent shocks affect
unemployment. We have seen that temporary and permanent shocks can
yield quite different inter-country comparisons of unemployment effects. For
example, temporal persistence (measuring unemployment responses to tem-
porary shocks) is greater in the UK system than in the German system which,
in turn, is greater than that in the US system; but temporal responsiveness
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(measuring unemployment responses to permanent shocks) is roughly the
same in all these systems.
Furthermore, we have seen that our quantitative and temporal measures
also can yield markedly different inter-country comparisons. For example,
our empirical results suggest that while the German, UK, and US systems
are all characterised by significant temporal persistence, only the German
and UK systems have significant quantitative persistence.
The chain reaction theory has quite different policy implications from
those of the natural rate and hysteresis theories. The natural rate theory fo-
cuses attention on policy measures that affect the long-term structure of the
labour market (such as tax changes, interest rate changes, and unemployment
benefit reform), while the hysteresis theory focuses on employment-creating
policy shocks and stabilisation policies to avoid the effects of adverse exoge-
nous shocks. By contrast, the chain reaction theory focuses on measures that
influence the flexibility of labour markets and their resilience in the aftermath
of recessions, by affecting the underlying lagged adjustment processes. For
instance, changes in job security legislation may affect how current employ-
ment decisions depend on past employment (by influencing labour turnover
costs); job counseling for the unemployed may influence how current wage
decisions depend on past unemployment (by influencing the search intensity
of the long-term unemployed); and wage indexation may affect the degree
to which these wage decisions depend on past wages. Since different pol-
icy variables affect different lagged adjustment processes, the identification
and measurement of behavioural labour market lags is important for policy
purposes.
Although our analysis has not been explicitly concerned with the design of
unemployment policy, it is easy to see that the empirical results above may
have some potentially significant policy implications. First, our empirical
analysis indicates that, within a particular country, different labour market
lags have quite different effects on unemployment persistence and imperfect
responsiveness. This is significant for policy formulation since, as noted,
different labour market policies affect different lags. Thus it is important
to assess the empirical importance of the various lags before unemployment
policy can be formulated.
Second, our analysis has shown that countries displaying a comparatively
high degree of unemployment persistence need not necessarily display a com-
paratively high degree of unemployment under-responsiveness as well. In
other words, the fact that temporary shocks have prolonged effects on un-
employment, does not mean that the full effects of permanent shocks will
be slow to manifest themselves. This result suggests that different policies
may be required to deal with temporary and permanent shocks. In short,
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assessments of the durability of labour market shocks have an important role
to play in the appropriate design of labour market policies.
Finally, our analysis showed that a particular lagged effect can have quite
different implications for unemployment dynamics in different countries. For
example, although the lags representing the employment adjustment effect
are quite similar in the UK and German systems, the contributions of this
effect to unemployment persistence and imperfect responsiveness are quite
different as between the two countries. The reason, of course, is that the un-
employment effect of any particular lag depends crucially on its interactions
with the other lags in the labour market system, and the latter vary from
country to country. This result, too, is potentially important for policy, since
it implies that different countries may require quite different policies to deal
with what may be similar unemployment trajectories.
The upshot of all these implications is that the appropriate design of
unemployment policy is a complex matter. We need to make judgements on
the durability of the shocks, relative importance of different labour market
lags, and their interaction before we can formulate the appropriate policies.
This is a tall order. But if it were easy, the European unemployment problem
would probably have been mastered by now.
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Tables
Table 1: Definitions of variables
Et : log of employment
Lt : log of labour force
ut : unemployment rate (ut = Lt − Et)
wt : log of real wage(=average earnings)
Kt : log of real capital stock
bt : log of real social security benefits
ct : log of real social security contributions
τ It : indirect taxes as a % of GDP
τDt : direct taxes as a % of GDP
poilt : log of real oil price
Zt : log of working age population
it : real long-term interest rate
rt : log of competitiveness
[
rt = log
(
price of imports
GDP deflator
)]
Nominal variables were deflated using the GDP deflator
Sources: OECD, IFS, Datastream
Table 2: UK, OLS, 1964-1992
[T1] ∆Et = 3.21 −0.34Et−2 +0.06wt +4.40Kt
(0.72) (0.06) (0.03) (0.52)
−6.70Kt−1 +2.44Kt−2 −0.39τ It −0.07ct, R2 = 0.91
(0.91) (0.47) (0.13) (0.03)
[T2] ∆wt = −1.53 −0.28wt−2 +0.16bt −0.03poilt
(0.43) (0.08) (0.05) (0.01)
−1.27τ It +0.86τ It−1, R2 = 0.56
(0.50) (0.44)
[T3] ∆Lt = −0.87 −0.49Lt−2 −0.23∆ut −0.09wt
(0.78) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05)
+0.12wt−1 +0.56Zt, R2 = 0.71
(0.05) (0.11)
(standard errors in parentheses)
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Table 3: US, OLS, 1964-1992
[T4] Et = 3.45 +0.56Et−1 +0.23wt +1.20Kt
(0.80) (0.12) (0.10) (0.37)
−2.37Kt−1 +1.39Kt−2 −2.43τ It −0.02poilt , R2 = 0.99
(0.53) (0.28) (0.46) (0.003)
[T5] ∆wt = 1.86 −0.28wt−2 −0.20Et−1 +0.07bt
(0.29) (0.07) (0.03) (0.01)
+0.37τDt −0.85τ It +0.20it, R2 = 0.79
(0.16) (0.32) (0.05)
[T6] Lt = −2.09 +0.64Lt−1 −0.18ut +0.53Zt, R2 = 0.99
(0.28) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
(standard errors in parentheses)
Table 4: GE, OLS, 1964-1990
[T7] ∆Et = 2.11 −0.33Et−2 −0.12wt +2.37Kt
(0.89) (0.10) (0.06) (0.33)
−3.23Kt−1 +1.00Kt−2 +0.05∆rt, R2 = 0.85
(0.66) (0.36) (0.02)
[T8] wt = −4.15 +0.37wt−1 −0.60ut +0.44ut−1
(0.94) (0.10) (0.19) (0.17)
+0.24Et−1 +0.29ct, R2 = 0.99
(0.08) (0.05)
[T9] ∆Lt = −2.69 −0.47Lt−2 −0.29ut −0.03wt−1
(0.45) (0.07) (0.06) (0.01)
+1.27Zt −1.57Zt−1 +1.00Zt−2, R2 = 0.94
(0.13) (0.25) (0.13)
(standard errors in parentheses)
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Table 5: GE, 3SLS, 1964-1990
[T10] ∆Et = 2.51 −0.37Et−2 −0.14wt +2.29Kt
(0.68) (0.07) (0.05) (0.25)
−3.03Kt−1 +0.89Kt−2 +0.05∆rt, R2 = 0.84
(0.49) (0.27) (0.01)
[T11] wt = −4.15 +0.41wt−1 −0.89ut +0.68ut−1
(0.79) (0.08) (0.16) (0.15)
+0.25Et−1 +0.27ct, R2 = 0.99
(0.07) (0.04)
[T12] ∆Lt = −2.75 −0.49Lt−2 −0.30ut −0.03wt−1
(0.39) (0.06) (0.05) (0.01)
+1.21Zt −1.40Zt−1 +0.93Zt−2, R2 = 0.94
(0.11) (0.21) (0.11)
Instruments: constant, Et−1, Et−2, wt−1, wt−2, Lt−1, Lt−2, Kt, Kt−1, Kt−2,
∆rt, rt−2, ct, Zt, Zt−1, Zt−2.
(asymptotic standard errors in parentheses)
Table 6: Sargan’s test
GE

Labour demand equation: χ2 (9) = 16.63 [0.06]
Wage-setting equation: χ2 (10) = 12.14 [0.28]
Labour supply equation: χ2 (9) = 11.10 [0.27]
Instruments: constant, Et−1, Et−2, wt−1, wt−2, Lt−1, Lt−2, Kt,
Kt−1, Kt−2,∆rt, rt−2, ct, Zt, Zt−1, Zt−2

[probabilities in square brackets]
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Table 7: Misspecification tests
Equation [T1] [T2] [T3] [T4] [T5] [T6]
SC[χ2 (1)] 3.79 0.39 2.37 0.54 0.01 0.64
LIN[χ2 (1)] 1.63 0.21 1.19 2.22 3.54 2.26
NOR[χ2 (2)] 0.16 2.40 1.82 0.74 1.86 0.01
HET[χ2 (1)] 0.76 0.50 2.03 1.24 2.87 0.28
ARCH[χ2 (1)] 1.54 0.81 1.05 0.55 0.09 0.10
Equation [T7] [T8] [T9] [T10] [T11] [T12]
SC[χ2 (1)] 1.08 0.88 2.80 1.82 4.68 4.16
SC[F -test] F (1, 19) =2.26 F (1, 18) =3.18
LIN[χ2 (1)] 2.28 0.02 4.10 2.97 2.70 4.59
LIN[F (1, 19)] 3.40 3.76
NOR[χ2 (1)] 0.01 3.35 0.47 0.06 1.34 0.63
HET[χ2 (1)] 0.16 0.61 0.63 0.03 0.30 0.70
ARCH[χ2 (1)] 1.73 1.05 1.39 1.04 2.26 0.24
5% critcal values: χ2 (1) = 3.84, χ2 (2) = 5.99,
F (1, 18) = 4.41, F (1, 19) = 4.38.
Table 8: Aggregate measures of persistence and imperfect responsiveness
UK US GE
piQ
(s.e)
[95% c.i.]
2.17
(0.10)
[1.93, 2.33]
0.27
(0.18)
[−0.04, 0.66]
0.72
(0.27)
[0.27, 1.22]
m
(s.e)
[95% c.i.]
0.81
(0.03)
[0.79, 0.92]
0.85
(0.03)
[0.82, 0.94]
0.64
(0.07)
[0.51, 0.77]
τ
(s.e)
[95% c.i.]
2.98
(0.10)
[2.78, 3.18]
1.12
(0.19)
[0.81, 1.56]
1.36
(0.29)
[0.84, 1.90]
piT
(s.e)
[95% c.i.]
6
(0.45)
[5, 6]
3
(0.53)
[2, 3]
3
(1.14)
[2, 6]
ρQ
(s.e)
[95% c.i.]
4.88
(1.04)
[2.69, 6.88]
−0.36
(0.42)
[−1.18, 0.43]
1.65
(0.33)
[1.12, 2.39]
ρT
(s.e)
[95% c.i.]
3
(1.41)
[2, 8]
4
(0.67)
[2, 4]
2
(1.18)
[2, 5]
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Table 9a: Quantitative unemployment persistence
in the absence of individual lagged effects
UK : τ = 2.98, m = 0.81, piQ = 2.17
m∼EA = 2.43, m∼WS = 0.81, m∼LF = 0.68
piQ∼EA = 0.55, pi
Q
∼WS = 2.17, pi
Q
∼LF = 2.30
US : τ = 1.12, m = 0.85, piQ = 0.27
m∼EA = 1.94, m∼WS = 0.85, m∼IM = 0.81, m∼LF = 0.67
piQ∼EA = −0.82, piQ∼WS = 0.27, piQ∼IM = 0.31, piQ∼LF = 0.45
GE : τ = 1.36, m = 0.64, piQ = 0.72
m∼EA = 1.70, m∼WS = 0.65, m∼LU = 0.69, m∼IM = 0.62, m∼LF = 0.42
piQ∼EA = −0.34, piQ∼WS = 0.71, piQ∼LU = 0.67, piQ∼IM = 0.74, piQ∼LF = 0.94
Table 9b: Quantitative imperfect unemployment responsiveness
in the absence of individual lagged effects
ρQ ρQ∼EA ρ
Q
∼WS ρ
Q
∼LU ρ
Q
∼IM ρ
Q
∼LF
UK 4.88 5.27 4.88 4.88
US -0.36 -0.13 -0.46 -0.42 -0.50
GE 1.65 1.76 1.63 1.68 1.63 1.64
Table 10a: Sources of unemployment persistence
piQ piQEA pi
Q
LF pi
Q
WS pi
Q
LU pi
Q
IM
UK 2.17 1.62 -0.13 0
US 0.27 1.09 -0.18 0 -0.04
GE 0.72 1.06 -0.22 0.01 0.05 -0.02
Table 10b: Sources of imperfect unemployment responsiveness
ρQ ρQEA ρ
Q
LF ρ
Q
WS ρ
Q
LU ρ
Q
IM
UK 4.88 -0.39 0 0
US -0.36 -0.23 0.14 0.10 0.06
GE 1.65 -0.11 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.02
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APPENDIX 1
Consider our labour market equations (6)-(8):
Et = a+ aEEt−1 + aKKt +
(
1
1 + awbE
)
εt, (A1.1)
Lt = c+ cLLt−1 + cEEt + cZZt, (A1.2)
ut = Lt − Et, (A1.3)
where a, aK , aw, bE, c, cE, cZ > 0, 0 < aE < 1, and 0 < cL < 1. Using the
backshift operator B we can express (A1.1)-(A1.2) as
(1− aEB)Et = a+ aKKt +
(
1
1 + awbE
)
εt, (A1.1’)
(1− cLB)Lt = c+ cEEt + cZZt (A1.2’)
Algebraic manipulation of (A1.1’), (A1.2’), and (A1.3) yields the following
reduced form unemployment rate equation:
(1− aEB) (1− cLB)ut = −θ (1− cE − cLB) εt (A1.4)
−aK (1− cE − cLB)Kt
+acE + (1− aE) c− (1− cL) a+ cZ (1− aEB)Zt,
where θ =
(
1
1+awbE
)
. Observe that (A1.4) is dynamically stable since 0 <
aE, cL < 1.
Consider a negative one-off unit shock to the labour demand equation
(A1.1), occuring at period t, i.e dεt = −1, dεt+j = 0, j = 1, 2, 3, .... Because of
the stability of the unemployment rate equation, the impact of the temporary
shock on unemployment will dissipate with the passage of time. Note that
(A1.4) is an ARMA(2,1) process in terms of εt. So the effects of the shock
on the unemployment rate, through time, are easily seen from its infinite
moving average (I.M.A.) representation46:
ut =
1
aE − cL
∞∑
j=0
(
a1+jE − c1+jL
) [−θ (1− cE) εt−j + θcLεt−1−j + ξt−j] ,
(A1.5)
where
ξt = −aK (1− cE − cLB)Kt+acE+(1− aE) c−(1− cL) a+cZ (1− aEB)Zt.
46See Sargent (1987), pp.184,191.
35
Therefore, the resulting change in the unemployment rate, j periods after
the occurence of the shock, dut+j, is given by
dut+j =
θ
[
ajE [(1− cE) aE − cL]− cjL [(1− cE) cL − cL]
]
(aE − cL) ,
=
ajE [(1− cE) aE − cL] + cEcj+1L
(1 + awbE) (aE − cL) , j ≥ 0. (A1.6)
The degree of quantitative unemployment persistence, piQ, is measured by
piQ =
∞∑
j=1
dut+j. (A1.7)
Substitution of eq.(A1.6) into eq.(A1.7) leads, after some algebraic manipu-
lation, to
piQ =
aE (1− cL)− cE [aE (1− cL) + cL]
(1 + awbE) (1− aE) (1− cL) , or (A1.8)
piQ =
aE (1− cL) (1− cE)− cEcL
(1 + awbE) (1− aE) (1− cL) , or (A1.8a)
piQ =
aE (1− cL − cE)− cEcL (1− aE)
(1 + awbE) (1− aE) (1− cL) . (A1.8b)
Observe that the denominator of the above equations is positive, so the sign of
piQ depends on the sign of the numerator of the above expressions. Inspection
of (A1.8a) and (A1.8b) shows that:
if

cE + cL > 1
cE + cL < 1 and aE <
cEcL
(1−cL)(1−cE)
cE + cL < 1 and aE =
cEcL
(1−cL)(1−cE)
cE + cL < 1 and aE >
cEcL
(1−cL)(1−cE)
 then

piQ < 0
piQ < 0
piQ = 0
piQ > 0
 . (A1.9)
Furthermore, the total impact (τ) of the above temporary shock on the un-
employment rate can be expressed as a sum of “present”,m, and “future”,piQ,
effects:
τ = m+ piQ =
(1− cL − cE)
(1 + awbE) (1− aE) (1− cL) , where (A1.10)
m ≡ dut = θ ≡ 1
(1 + awbE)
. (A1.11)
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To derive the unemployment rate equation in the absence of the em-
ployment adjustment effect (∼ EA), we set the backshift operator in the
(1− aEB) expression of eq.(A1.4) equal to one.47 So we get that:
(1− cLB)ut = − θ
(1− aE) (1− cE − cLB) εt (A1.12)
− aK
(1− aE) (1− cE − cLB)Kt
+
acE
(1− aE) + c−
(1− cL) a
(1− aE) + cZZt.
Since 0 < cL < 1, the above equation is stable. Note that (A1.12) is an
ARMA(1,1) process in terms of εt. So the effects of the temporary labour
demand shock on the unemployment rate, through time, can be seen from
the infinite moving average (I.M.A.) representation of (A1.12):
ut =
−θ (1− cE)
(1− aE) εt +
θcE
(1− aE)
∞∑
j=1
cjLεt−j +
∞∑
j=0
cjLξt−j, (A1.13)
where
ξt = −
aK
(1− aE) (1− cE − cLB)Kt +
acE
(1− aE) + c−
(1− cL) a
(1− aE) + cZZt.
So we have that
dut+j = − θcEc
j
L
(1− aE) , j ≥ 1, (A1.14)
m∼EA ≡ dut = θ (1− cE)
(1− aE) . (A1.15)
To measure the degree of quantitative unemployment persistence in the ab-
sence of the employment adjustment effect we insert (A1.14) into eq.(A1.7),
and with some algebraic manipulation, we get
piQ∼EA = −
θcEcL
(1− aE) (1− cL) < 0. (A1.16)
Observe that
m+ piQ = m∼EA + pi
Q
∼EA = τ . (A1.17)
47Alternatively, we can set Et = Et−1 in the labour demand equation (A1.1) and then
derive the corresponding reduced form unemployment rate equation.
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Furthermore, the degree of quantitative unemployment persistence attributable
to the employment adjustment effect is measured as follows:
piQEA = pi
Q − piQ∼EA =
θaE (1− cE)
(1− aE) . (A1.18)
Note that if cE < 1 then pi
Q
EA > 0.
To derive the unemployment rate in the absence of the labour force
adjustment effect (∼ LF ), we set the backshift operator in the (1− cLB)
and (1− cE − cLB) polynomials of eq.(A1.4) equal to one,48 and we get
(1− aEB)ut = − θ
(1− cL) (1− cE − cL) εt (A1.19)
− aK
(1− cL) (1− cE − cL)Kt
+
acE
(1− cL) +
(1− aE) c
(1− cL) − a+
cZ (1− aEB)Zt
(1− cL) .
Since 0 < aE < 1, the above equation is stable. Note that (A1.19) is an
AR(1) process in terms of εt. So the effects of the temporary labour demand
shock on the unemployment rate, through time, can be seen from the infinite
moving average (I.M.A.) representation of the above equation:
ut =
−θ (1− cE − cL)
(1− cL)
∞∑
j=0
ajEεt−j +
∞∑
j=0
ajEξt−j, (A1.20)
where
ξt = −
aK
(1− cL) (1− cE − cL)Kt+
acE
(1− cL)+
(1− aE) c
(1− cL) −a+
cZ (1− aEB)Zt
(1− cL) .
So the unemployment responses to a negative one-off unit labour demand
shock (dεt = −1) are given by
dut+j =
θ (1− cE − cL) ajE
(1− cL) , j ≥ 0, (A1.21)
m∼LF ≡ dut = θ (1− cE − cL)
(1− cL) . (A1.21’)
To measure the degree of quantitative unemployment persistence in the ab-
sence of the labour force adjustment effect, we insert (A1.21) into eq.(A1.7)
to obtain
piQ∼LF =
θaE (1− cE − cL)
(1− aE) (1− cL) . (A1.22)
48Alternatively, we can set Lt = Lt−1 in the labour force equation (A1.2) and then
derive the corresponding reduced form unemployment rate equation.
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If cE + cL < 1 then pi
Q
∼LF > 0. Also note that
m+ piQ = m∼EA + pi
Q
∼EA = m∼LF + pi
Q
∼LF = τ . (A1.23)
Finally, the degree of quantitative unemployment persistence attributable to
the labour force adjustment effect is measured as follows:
piQLF = pi
Q − piQ∼LF = −
θcEcL
(1− cL) < 0. (A1.24)
Note that piQEA + pi
Q
LF = pi
Q, i.e. the employment and labour force adjust-
ment effects interact as substitutes in generating the aggregate measure of
quantitative responsiveness.
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APPENDIX 2
Within the framework of Appendix 1, let the capital stock (Kt) follow a
random walk stochastic process, given by Kt = Kt−1 + vt, vt ∼ i.i.d (0, σ2v) ,
and consider a negative one-off unit shock to the capital stock equation,
occuring at period t, i.e. dvt = −1, dvt+j = 0, j = 1, 2, 3, ... As a result, the
capital stock is permanently reduced by one unit from period t onwards. In
particular, the response of the capital stock to the above shock, j periods
after its occurence, is dKt+j = −1, j ≥ 0.
Since the unemployment rate depends on capital stock, a permanent
change in the latter will permanently affect the former. The resulting change
in the unemployment rate will depend on its dynamic structure. Below, we
examine three different possibilities:
(I) In the presence of all the lagged effects the unemployment rate
equation (A1.4) can be written in the following ARMA(2,1) form:
ut = (aE + cL)ut−1 − aEcLut−2 − aK (1− cE)Kt + aKcLKt−1 + ζt, (A2.1)
where
ζt = −θ (1− cE − cLB) εt + acE + (1− aE) c− (1− cL) a+ cZ (1− aEB)Zt.
The change in the unemployment rate, j periods after the occurence of the
above shock, is given by the following second order difference equation:
(1− aEB) (1− cLB) dut+j = −aK (1− cE) dKt+j + aKcLdKt+j−1, j ≥ 0,(A2.2)
(1− aEB) (1− cLB) dut+j = aK (1− cE)− aKcL, j ≥ 1. (A2.2’)
In the long-run, the change in the unemployment rate is
du∗ =
aK (1− cE − cL)
(1− aE) (1− cL) . (A2.3)
The infinite moving average (I.M.A) representation of ut is given byf
ut =
1
aE − cL
∞∑
j=0
(
a1+jE − c1+jL
) [−aK (1− cE)Kt−j + aKcLKt−1−j + ζt−j] .
(A2.4)
Therefore, the response of the unemployment rate to a permanent unit de-
crease in the capital stock is
dut+j =
aK
aE − cL
[
(1− cE)
j∑
i=0
(
ai+1E − ci+1L
)− cL j∑
i=0
(
aiE − ciL
)]
, j ≥ 0,
(A2.5)
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The degree of imperfect responsiveness is measured by
ρQ =
∞∑
j=0
(dut+j − du∗) . (A2.6)
Since
∑j
i=0 λ
i+1 =
λ(1−λj+1)
1−λ ,
∑j
i=0 λ
i =
(1−λj+1)
1−λ , where |λ| < 1, it can be
shown that substitution of (A2.3) and (A2.5) into (A2.6) leads to
ρQ =
aK [−aE (1− cE − cL) (1− cL) + cLcE (1− aE)]
[(1− aE) (1− cL)]2
(A2.7)
Since the denominator of the above equation is positive, the sign of ρQ de-
pends on the sign of the numerator. Inspection of (A2.7) gives that:
if

cE + cL > 1
cE + cL < 1 and aE <
cEcL
(1−cL)(1−cE−cL)+cEcL
cE + cL < 1 and aE =
cEcL
(1−cL)(1−cE−cL)+cEcL
cE + cL < 1 and aE >
cEcL
(1−cL)(1−cE−cL)+cEcL
 then

ρQ > 0
ρQ > 0
ρQ = 0
ρQ < 0
 .
(A2.8)
Observe that when cE+cL < 1 then
cEcL
(1−cL)(1−cE−cL)+cEcL =
cEcL
(1−cL)(1−cE)−cL(1−cL−cE) >
cEcL
(1−cL)(1−cE) (ref. Figure 1).
(II) In the absence of the employment adjustment effect the un-
employment rate is given by equation (A1.12) which can be written in the
following ARMA(1,1) form:
(1− cLB)ut = − aK
(1− aE) (1− cE − cLB)Kt + ζt, (A2.9)
where
ζt = −
θ
(1− aE) (1− cE − cLB) εt +
acE
(1− aE) + c−
(1− cL) a
(1− aE) + cZZt.
Its I.M.A. representation is given by
ut =
−aK (1− cE)
(1− aE) Kt +
aKcE
(1− aE)
∞∑
j=1
cjLKt−j +
∞∑
j=0
cjLζt−j. (A2.10)
Thus the response of the unemployment rate to a permanent unit decrease
in capital stock is
dut =
aK (1− cE)
1− aE , dut+j =
aK
1− aE
[
(1− cE)− cE
j∑
i=1
ciL
]
, j ≥ 1.
(A2.11)
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To derive our measure of the degree of quantitative imperfect unemployment
responsiveness in the absence of the employment adjustment effect
(
ρQ∼EA
)
we substitute (A2.11) and (A2.3) into (A2.6) and, with simple algebraic
manipulation, we get
ρQ∼EA =
aKcEcL
(1− aE) (1− cL)2
> 0. (A2.12)
Furthermore, the degree of quantitative imperfect unemployment responsive-
ness attributable to the employment adjustment effect is given by
ρQEA = ρ
Q − ρQ∼EA =
−aKaE (1− cE − cL)
(1− aE)2 (1− cL)
. (A2.13)
Observe that the above measure is negative when cE + cL < 1.
(III) In the absence of the labour force adjustment effect the
unemployment rate is given by equation (A1.19) which we can rewrite in the
following AR(1) form:
(1− aEB)ut = − aK
(1− cL) (1− cE − cL)Kt + ζt, (A2.14)
where
ζt = −
θ
(1− cL) (1− cE − cL) εt+
acE
(1− cL)+
(1− aE) c
(1− cL) −a+
cZ (1− aEB)Zt
(1− cL) .
The I.M.A. representation of (A2.14) is
ut =
−aK (1− cE − cL)
(1− cL)
∞∑
j=0
ajEKt−j +
∞∑
j=0
ajEζt−j. (A2.13)
In this case the response of the unemployment rate to a permanent unit
decrease in capital stock is given by
dut+j =
−aK (1− cE − cL)
(1− cL)
j∑
i=0
aiE, j ≥ 0. (A2.14)
Substitution of (A2.14) and (A2.3) into (A2.6) gives our measure of the degree
of quantitative imperfect unemployment responsiveness in the absence of the
labour force adjustment effect:
ρQ∼LF =
−aKaE (1− cE − cL)
(1− aE)2 (1− cL)
. (A2.15)
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So the degree of quantitative imperfect unemployment responsiveness at-
tributable to the labour force adjustment effect is given by
ρQLF = ρ
Q − ρQ∼LF =
aKcEcL
(1− aE) (1− cL)2
> 0. (A2.16)
Note that ρQEA + ρ
Q
LF = ρ
Q, i.e. the employment and labour force adjust-
ment effects are neither complementary nor substitutes when generating the
aggregate measure of quantitative responsiveness.
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APPENDIX 3
In what follows we present an analytical method for the computation of
our measures of quantitative unemployment persistence which are given in
Table 9a.
(I) The estimated UK labour market system (see Table 2) is
∆Et = β1 + β2Et−2 + β3wt + β4Kt + β5Kt−1 + β6Kt−2 + β7τ
I
t + β8ct,
(A3.1)
∆wt = β9 + β10wt−2 + β11bt + β12p
oil
t + β13τ
I
t + β14τ
I
t−1, (A3.2)
∆Lt = β15 + β16Lt−2 + β17∆ut + β18wt + β19wt−1 + β20Zt, (A3.3)
where ∆ is the difference operator, the β’s are the esimated parameters, and
the capital stock (Kt) is assumed to follow a random walk. Note that a one-
off unit reduction in the constant of eq.(A3.1) gives rise to our temporary
labour demand shock, whereas, a once and for all unit reduction in capital
stock generates our permanent labour demand shock. An alternative way to
express the above equations is as follows:(
1−B − β2B2
)
Et = C
E
t + β3wt, (A3.1’)(
1−B − β10B2
)
wt = C
w
t , (A3.2’)(
1−B − β16B2
)
Lt = C
L
t + β17 (1−B)ut + (β18 + β19B)wt,(A3.3’)
where B is the backshift operator, and
CEt = β1 + β4Kt + β5Kt−1 + β6Kt−2 + β7τ
I
t + β8ct, (A3.1”)
Cwt = β9 + β11bt + β12p
oil
t + β13τ
I
t + β14τ
I
t−1, (A3.2”)
CLt = β15 + β20Zt. (A3.3”)
Algebraic manipulation of equations (A3.1’)-(A3.3’) together with the unem-
ployment rate definition, ut = Lt−Et, give the reduced form equation of the
unemployment rate:[(
1−B − β16B2
)− β17 (1−B)] (1−B − β2B2) (1−B − β10B2)ut
= − (1−B − β10B2) (1−B − β16B2)CEt
+
[
(β18 + β19B)
(
1−B − β2B2
)− β3 (1−B − β16B2)]Cwt
+
(
1−B − β2B2
) (
1−B − β10B2
)
CLt . (A3.4)
The steady-state solution of the above is obtained by setting the backshift
operator equal to one, and is given by
ut =
CEt
β2
+
[(β18 + β19) (−β2) + β3β16]Cwt
−β2β10β16
+
CLt
−β16
. (A3.4’)
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Further algebraic manipulation of (A3.4) yields:
ut = φ1ut−1 + φ2ut−2 + φt−3ut−3 + φ4ut−4 + φ5ut−5 + φ6ut−6
+θ10C
E
t + θ11C
E
t−1 + θ12C
E
t−2 + θ13C
E
t−3 + θ14C
E
t−4
+θ20C
w
t + θ21C
w
t−1 + θ22C
w
t−2 + θ23C
w
t−3
+θ30C
L
t + θ31C
L
t−1 + θ32C
L
t−2 + θ33C
L
t−3 + θ34C
L
t−4, (A3.5)
where
φ1 = 3, φ2 = −3 + β2 + β10 +
β16
1− β17
,
φ3 = 1− 2 (β2 + β10)−
2β16
1− β17
,
φ4 = β2 + β10 − β2β10 +
β16 (1− β2 − β10)
1− β17
,
φ5 = β2β10 +
β16 (β2 + β10)
1− β17
, φ6 =
β2β10β16
1− β17
,
θ10 =
−1
1− β17
, θ11 =
2
1− β17
, θ12 =
−1 + β16 + β10
1− β17
,
θ13 =
−β16 − β10
1− β17
, θ14 =
−β16β10
1− β17
,
θ20 =
β18 − β3
1− β17
, θ21 =
β3 + β19 − β18
1− β17
,
θ22 =
β3β16 − β19 − β18β2
1− β17
, θ23 =
−β19β2
1− β17
,
θ30 =
1
1− β17
, θ31 =
−2
1− β17
, θ32 =
1− β2 − β10
1− β17
,
θ33 =
β2 + β10
1− β17
, θ34 =
β2β10
1− β17
.
From equation (A3.5) it is clear that the immediate impact of a temporary
(permanent) negative unit labour demand shock on the unemployment rate is
−θ10 (−θ10β4) , i.e. m = 11−β17 = 0.81 (mβ4 = 3.58) . Furthermore, the total
impact (τ) of a temporary negative unit labour demand shock on the unem-
ployment rate is given by minus the coefficient of CEt in equation (A3.4’), i.e.
τ = −1
β2
= 2.98.49 Therefore, our measure of quantitative persistence
(
piQ
)
can be obtained by subtracting the immediate impact of the shock from its
total impact: piQ = τ − m = 2.17. In addition, the long-run change in the
49See Hamilton (1994), ch.1, pp7.
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unemployment rate, du∗, due to a permanent negative unit labour demand
shock, can be computed as: du∗ = β4+β5+β6−β2 = τ (β4 + β5 + β6) = 0.39.
In the absence of the employment adjustment effect (∼ EA) , the reduced
form unemployment rate equation is obtained by setting the backshift oper-
ator in the (1−B − β2B2) expression of eq.(A3.4) equal to one50:
(∼ EA) : −β2
[(
1−B − β16B2
)− β17 (1−B)] (1−B − β10B2)ut
= − (1−B − β10B2) (1−B − β16B2)CEt
+
[−β2 (β18 + β19B)− β3 (1−B − β16B2)]Cwt
−β2
(
1−B − β10B2
)
CLt . (A3.6)
Observe that m∼EA = 1−β2(1−β17) = 2.43, pi
Q
∼EA = τ− m∼EA = 0.55.
In the absence of the wage staggering effect (∼ WS) , the reduced form
unemployment rate equation is obtained by setting the backshift operator in
the (1−B − β10B2) expression of eq.(A3.4) equal to one:
(∼ WS) : −β10
[(
1−B − β16B2
)− β17 (1−B)] (1−B − β2B2)ut
= β10
(
1−B − β16B2
)
CEt
+
[
(β18 + β19B)
(
1−B − β2B2
)− β3 (1−B − β16B2)]Cwt
−β10
(
1−B − β2B2
)
CLt . (A3.7)
Observe that m∼WS = m, and so pi
Q
∼WS = pi. Since the wage-setting equation
(A3.2) does not include, in its right-hand side, any employment or unem-
ployment terms, the wage staggering effect influences neither our measure of
quantitative persistence nor the imperfect responsiveness one.
In the absence of the labour force adjustment effect (∼ LF ) , the reduced
form unemployment rate equation is obtained by setting the backshift oper-
ator in the (1−B − β16B2) expression of eq.(A3.4) equal to one:
(∼ LF ) : [−β16 − β17 (1−B)]
(
1−B − β2B2
) (
1−B − β10B2
)
ut
= β16
(
1−B − β10B2
)
CEt
+
[
(β18 + β19B)
(
1−B − β2B2
)
+ β3β16
]
Cwt
+
(
1−B − β2B2
) (
1−B − β10B2
)
CLt . (A3.8)
Observe that m∼LF =
β16
β16+β17
= 0.68, piQ∼LF = τ− m∼LF = 2.30.
50By setting the backshift operator equal to one (B = 1) we preserve the long-run so-
lution of the unemployment rate equation. This implies that the total impact (τ) of
a temporary labour demand shock on unemployment, and the long-run unemployment
change (du∗) due to a permanent labour demand shock, are not affected by the absence
of any of the individual lagged effects.
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(II) The estimated US labour market system (see Table 3) is
Et = β1 + β2Et−1 + β3wt + β4Kt + β5Kt−1 + β6Kt−2 + β7p
oil
t + β8τ
I
t ,
(A3.9)
∆wt = β9 + β10wt−2 + β11Et−1 + β12bt + β13τ
D
t + β14τ
I
t + β15it, (A3.10)
Lt = β16 + β17Lt−1 + β18ut + β19Zt (A3.11)
Alternatively, we can write:
(1− β2B)Et = CEt + β3wt, (A3.9’)(
1−B − β10B2
)
wt = C
w
t + β11BEt, (A3.10’)
(1− β17B)Lt = CLt + β18ut, (A3.11’)
where
CEt = β1 + β4Kt + β5Kt−1 + β6Kt−2 + β7p
oil
t + β8τ
I
t , (A3.9”)
Cwt = β9 + β12bt + β13τ
D
t + β14τ
I
t + β15it, (A3.10”)
CLt = β16 + β19Zt. (A3.11”)
Algebraic manipulation of equations (A3.9’)-(A3.11’) together with the un-
employment rate definition, ut = Lt − Et, give the reduced form equation of
the unemployment rate:
[(1− β17B)− β18]
[
(1− β2B)
(
1−B − β10B2
)− β3β11B]ut
= − (1−B − β10B2) (1− β17B)CEt − β3 (1− β17B)Cwt
+
[
(1− β2B)
(
1−B − β10B2
)− β3β11B]CLt . (A3.12)
The steady-state solution of eq.(A3.12) is obtained by setting the backshift
operator equal to one, and is given by
ut =
β10 (1− β17)CEt − β3 (1− β17)Cwt
(1− β17 − β18) (β2β10 − β10 − β3β11)
+
CLt
(1− β17 − β18)
. (A3.12’)
Further algebraic manipulation of (A3.12) yields:
ut = φ1ut−1 + φ2ut−2 + φt−3ut−3 + φ4ut−4
+θ10C
E
t + θ11C
E
t−1 + θ12C
E
t−2 + θ13C
E
t−3
+θ20C
w
t + θ21C
w
t−1
+θ30C
L
t + θ31C
L
t−1 + θ32C
L
t−2 + θ33C
L
t−3, (A3.13)
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where
φ1 = 1 + β2 + β3β11 +
β17
1− β18
,
φ2 = β10 − β2 −
β17 (1 + β2 + β3β11)
1− β18
,
φ3 = −β2β10 −
β17 (β10 − β2)
1− β18
, φ4 =
β17β2β10
1− β18
,
θ10 =
−1
1− β18
, θ11 =
1 + β17
1− β18
, θ12 =
β10 − β17
1− β18
, θ13 =
−β10β17
1− β18
,
θ20 =
−β3
1− β18
, θ21 =
β3β17
1− β18
,
θ30 =
1
1− β18
, θ31 =
− (1 + β2 + β3β11)
1− β18
, θ32 =
β2 − β10
1− β18
, θ33 =
β2β10
1− β18
.
Inspection of equations (A3.12)-(A3.13) gives: m = 1
1−β18 = 0.85,
τ =
−β10 (1− β17)
(1− β17 − β18) (β2β10 − β10 − β3β11)
= 1.12,
piQ = τ −m = 0.27, du∗ = τ (β4 + β5 + β6) = 0.24, and immediate impact
of the permanent shock is mβ4 = 1.02.
In the absence of the employment adjustment effect (∼ EA) , the reduced
form unemployment rate equation is obtained by setting the backshift oper-
ator in the (1− β2B) expression of eq.(A3.12) equal to one:
(∼ EA) : [(1− β17B)− β18]
[
(1− β2)
(
1−B − β10B2
)− β3β11B]ut
= − (1−B − β10B2) (1− β17B)CEt − β3 (1− β17B)Cwt
+
[
(1− β2)
(
1−B − β10B2
)− β3β11B]CLt . (A3.14)
Observe that m∼EA = 1(1−β2)(1−β18) = 0.94, pi
Q
∼EA = τ− m∼EA = −0.82.
In the absence of the wage staggering effect (∼ WS) , the reduced form
unemployment rate equation is obtained by setting the backshift operator in
the (1−B − β10B2) expression of eq.(A3.12) equal to one:
(∼ WS) : [(1− β17B)− β18] [−β10 (1− β2B)− β3β11B]ut
= +β10 (1− β17B)CEt − β3 (1− β17B)Cwt
+ [−β10 (1− β2B)− β3β11B]CLt . (A3.15)
Observe that m∼WS = m = 11−β18 , so pi
Q
∼WS = pi.
48
In the absence of the insider membership effect (∼ IM) , the reduced form
unemployment rate equation is obtained by setting the backshift operator in
the β11B expression of eq.(A3.12) equal to one:
(∼ IM) : [(1− β17B)− β18]
[
(1− β2B)
(
1−B − β10B2
)− β3β11]ut
= − (1−B − β10B2) (1− β17B)CEt − β3 (1− β17B)Cwt
+
[
(1− β2B)
(
1−B − β10B2
)− β3β11]CLt . (A3.16)
Observe that m∼IM = 1(1−β3β11)(1−β18) = 0.81, pi
Q
∼IM = τ− m∼IM = 0.31.
In the absence of the labour force adjustment effect (∼ LF ) , the reduced
form unemployment rate equation is obtained by setting the backshift oper-
ator in the (1− β17B) expression of eq.(A3.12) equal to one:
(∼ LF ) : [(1− β17)− β18]
[
(1− β2B)
(
1−B − β10B2
)− β3β11B]ut
= − (1−B − β10B2) (1− β17)CEt − β3 (1− β17)Cwt
+
[
(1− β2B)
(
1−B − β10B2
)− β3β11B]CLt . (A3.17)
Observe that m∼LF =
1−β17
1−β17−β18 = 0.67, pi
Q
∼LF = τ− m∼LF = 0.45.
(III) The estimated German labour market system (see Table 5) is
∆Et = β1 + β2Et−2 + β3wt + β4Kt + β5Kt−1 + β6Kt−2 + β7∆rt,(A3.18)
wt = β8 + β9wt−1 + β10ut + β11ut−1 + β12Et−1 + β13ct, (A3.19)
∆Lt = β14 + β15Lt−2 + β16ut + β17wt−1 + β18Zt + β19Zt−1 + β20Zt−2.
(A3.20)
Alternatively, we can write:(
1−B − β2B2
)
Et = C
E
t + β3wt, (A3.18’)
(1− β9B)wt = Cwt + (β10 + β11B)ut + β12BEt, (A3.19’)(
1−B − β15B2
)
Lt = C
L
t + β16ut + β17Bwt, (A3.20’)
where
CEt = β1 + β4Kt + β5Kt−1 + β6Kt−2 + β7∆rt, (A3.18”)
Cwt = β8 + β13ct, (A3.19”)
CLt = β14 + β18Zt + β19Zt−1 + β20Zt−2. (A3.20”)
Algebraic manipulation of equations (A3.18’)-(A3.20’) together with the un-
employment rate definition, ut = Lt − Et, give the reduced form equation of
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the unemployment rate:{
[(1−B − β15B2)− β16] [(1− β9B) (1−B − β2B2)− β3β12B]
+ (β10 + β11B) [β3 (1−B − β15B2)− β17B (1−B − β2B2)]
}
ut
=
[
β12Bβ17B −
(
1−B − β15B2
)
(1− β9B)
]
CEt
− [β3 (1−B − β15B2)− β17B (1−B − β2B2)]Cwt
+
[
(1− β9B)
(
1−B − β2B2
)− β3β12B]CLt . (A3.21)
The steady-state solution of the above equation is obtained by setting B = 1,
and is given by
ut =
[β12β17+β15(1−β9)]CEt +(β3β15+β2β17)Cwt −[β2(1−β9)+β3β12]CLt
(β15+β16)[β2(1−β9)+β3β12]+(β10+β11)(β2β17−β3β15) (A3.21’)
Further algebraic manipulation of (A3.21) gives
ut = φ1ut−1 + φ2ut−2 + φt−3ut−3 + φ4ut−4 + φ5ut−5
+Θ1 (B)C
E
t +Θ2 (B)C
w
t +Θ3 (B)C
L
t , (A3.22)
where
φ1 =
2 + β9 + β3β12 + β10β3 − β11β3 + β10β17 − β16 (1 + β9 + β3β12)
1 + β10β3 − β16
,
φ2 =
β10β3β15 + β11β3 − β16 (β2 − β9) + β11β17
1 + β10β3 − β16
+
β2 + β15 − β3β12 − β10β17 − 1− 2β9
1 + β10β3 − β16
,
φ3 =
β11β3β15 + β9 − β10β17β2 − β11β17 − β9β2
1 + β10β3 − β16
+
−β2 − β15β3β12 − β15 + β16β9β2 − β15β9
1 + β10β3 − β16
,
φ4 =
β9β2 − β15 (β2 − β9)− β11β17β2
1 + β10β3 − β16
, φ5 =
β2β9β15
1 + β10β3 − β16
,
Θ1 (B) =
[−1 + (1 + β9)B + (β15 + β17β12 − β9)B2 − β9β15B3]
1 + β10β3 − β16
,
Θ2 (B) =
[−β3 + (β3 + β17)B + (β3β15 − β17)B2 − β17β2B3]
1 + β10β3 − β16
,
Θ3 (B) =
[1− (1 + β3β12 + β9)B − (β2 − β9)B2 + β9β2B3]
1 + β10β3 − β16
.
Inspection of eq.(A3.21’) gives
du∗ = −[β12β17+β15(1−β9)](β4+β5+β6)
(β15+β16)[β2(1−β9)+β3β12]+(β10+β11)(β2β17−β3β15) = 0.21.
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From eq.(A3.21) we can see that the immediate impact of the permanent
shock on unemployment is equal to β4
1+β10β3−β16 = 1.61. In contrast to the
UK and US models, the German one is characterised by cross equation cor-
relation. In this case, as it was explained in Section *, when we compute
the unemployment persistence measures we assume that Cwt = b1C
E
t and
CLt = b2C
E
t + b3C
w
t , where b1 = −0.72, b2 = 0.28, b3 = 0.14 51. Therefore, we
have that: m = 1+β3b1−b2−b1b3
1+β10β3−β16 = 0.64, and
τ = − [β12β17+β15(1−β9)]+(β3β15+β2β17)b1−[β2(1−β9)+β3β12](b2+b1b3)
(β15+β16)[β2(1−β9)+β3β12]+(β10+β11)(β2β17−β3β15) = 1.36.
In the absence of the employment adjustment effect (∼ EA) , the reduced
form unemployment rate equation is obtained by setting the backshift oper-
ator in the (1−B − β2B2) expression of eq.(A3.21) equal to one:
(∼ EA) :
{
[(1−B − β15B2)− β16] [−β2 (1− β9B)− β3β12B]
+ (β10 + β11B) [β3 (1−B − β15B2)− β17B (1−B − β2B2)]
}
ut
=
[
β12Bβ17B −
(
1−B − β15B2
)
(1− β9B)
]
CEt
− [β3 (1−B − β15B2)+ β2β17B]Cwt
+ [−β2 (1− β9B)− β3β12B]CLt . (A3.23)
Note that m∼EA =
1+β3b1+β2(b2+b1b3)
−β2(1−β16)+β3β10 = 1.70, pi
Q
∼EA = τ− m∼EA = −0.34.
In the absence of the wage staggering effect (∼ WS) , the reduced form
unemployment rate equation is obtained by setting the backshift operator in
the (1− β9B) expression of eq.(A3.21) equal to one:
(∼ WS) :
{
[(1−B − β15B2)− β16] [(1− β9) (1−B − β2B2)− β3β12B]
+ (β10 + β11B) [β3 (1−B − β15B2)− β17B (1−B − β2B2)]
}
ut
=
[
β12Bβ17B −
(
1−B − β15B2
)
(1− β9)
]
CEt
− [β3 (1−B − β15B2)− β17B (1−B − β2B2)]Cwt
+
[
(1− β9)
(
1−B − β2B2
)− β3β12B]CLt . (A3.24)
Observe that m∼WS =
(1−β9)+β3b1−(1−β9)(b2+b1b3)
(1−β9)(1−β16)+β3β10 = 0.65, so pi
Q
∼WS = τ −
m∼WS = 0.71.
In the absence of the long-term unemployment effect (∼ LU) , the re-
duced form unemployment rate equation is obtained by setting the backshift
51Recall that b1 is the coefficient obtained by regressing the residuals of (A3.19) on those
of (A3.18); to obtain b2, b3 we regress the residuals of (A3.20) on the ones of (A3.18) and
(A3.19).
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operator in the β11B expression of eq.(A3.21) equal to one:
(∼ LU) :
{
[(1−B − β15B2)− β16] [(1− β9B) (1−B − β2B2)− β3β12B]
+ (β10 + β11) [β3 (1−B − β15B2)− β17B (1−B − β2B2)]
}
ut
=
[
β12Bβ17B −
(
1−B − β15B2
)
(1− β9B)
]
CEt
− [β3 (1−B − β15B2)− β17B (1−B − β2B2)]Cwt
+
[
(1− β9B)
(
1−B − β2B2
)− β3β12B]CLt . (A3.25)
Observe that m∼LU =
1+β3b1−b2−b1b3
1−β16+β3(β10+β11) = 0.69, so pi
Q
∼WS = τ −m∼LU = 0.67.
In the absence of the insider membership effect (∼ IM) , the reduced form
unemployment rate equation is obtained by setting the backshift operator in
the β12B expression of eq.(A3.21) equal to one:
(∼ IM) :
{
[(1−B − β15B2)− β16] [(1− β9B) (1−B − β2B2)− β3β12]
+ (β10 + β11B) [β3 (1−B − β15B2)− β17B (1−B − β2B2)]
}
ut
=
[
β12β17B −
(
1−B − β15B2
)
(1− β9B)
]
CEt
− [β3 (1−B − β15B2)− β17B (1−B − β2B2)]Cwt
+
[
(1− β9B)
(
1−B − β2B2
)− β3β12]CLt . (A3.26)
Observe that m∼IM =
1+β3b1−(1−β3β12)(b2+b3b1)
(1−β3β12)(1−β16)+β3β10 = 0.62, pi
Q
∼IM = τ− m∼IM =
0.74.
In the absence of the labour force adjustment effect (∼ LF ) , the reduced
form unemployment rate equation is obtained by setting the backshift oper-
ator in the (1−B − β15B2) expression of eq.(A3.21) equal to one:
(∼ LF ) :
{
[−β15 − β16] [(1− β9B) (1−B − β2B2)− β3β12B]
+ (β10 + β11B) [−β3β15 − β17B (1−B − β2B2)]
}
ut
= [β12Bβ17B + β15 (1− β9B)]CEt
− [−β3β15 − β17B (1−B − β2B2)]Cwt
+
[
(1− β9B)
(
1−B − β2B2
)− β3β12B]CLt . (A3.27)
Note that m∼LF =
−β15−β3β15b1−b2−b3b1
1−β16−β3β10β15 = 0.42, pi
Q
∼LF = τ− m∼LF = 0.94.
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